Moving data across a boundary, and proving you did it safely

This dive is deliberately reframed away from exotic cross-domain solutions (which we do not sell and which are vendor-dominated) toward the real agency problem: moving data across boundaries that were never properly connected, and being able to prove each transfer. The 2025 lesson from ransomware is that transfer and backup systems sharing credentials and domains with production is what gets them destroyed.

1. The real problem. Files, scripts and APIs across boundaries that grew separately.
2. Why not a diode. What we do instead, and when a CDS is genuinely someone else's job.
3. Constrained movement. One-way where it must be, brokered where it can be.
4. Provenance and logging. Proving what moved, when, and by whom.
5. Separation from production. The credential and domain isolation that survives an incident.

Reframed to match the positioning exactly (CLAUDE.md says we are not a hardware CDS). It leads with reliability and provability rather than a threat, and it is honest about the boundary of what we do, which builds trust with a sceptical buyer.

• Explicitly disclaim the hardware-CDS framing; state what we actually do.
• Lead with provability and assurance, not attacks.
• Use the backup-failure lesson for credential and domain separation.
• This is the one topic reframed rather than merely sharpened; keep it grounded.